knowing the enemy: the anthropology of insurgency
George Packer has written an interesting article in the New Yorker on the role of social scientists to help redefine the war on terror.
David Kilcullen, an Australian who has a doctorate in political anthropology from the University of New South Wales, wrote on the Darul Islam conflict, a Muslim insurgency movement in Indonesia during the 1950's and 1960's. During his study he saw similar behavior and similar problems in an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a Christian separatist insurgency in East Timor. He felt the problem was not Islam but human social networks and the way that they operate. People get pulled into insurgency through friends, family and associates.
Kilcullen noted after watching Bin Laden tapes, that Bin Laden was creating an implicit association between himself and the Democratic party, for he believed that Bush’s strategy on the war on terror was sustaining his own global importance. “Al Qaeda’s core leadership had became a propaganda hub. If Bin laden didnt have access to global media, satellite communications, and the internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave.”
Countering counterinsurgency requires rethinking the current thinking about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kilcullen redefined the war on terror as a “global counterinsurgency”. Knowing the turf, which includes the people, topography, economy, history and culture of the area is essential.Also there is a need to “disaggregate insurgencies: finding ways to address local grievances in Pakistan’s tribal areas or along the Thai and Malay border, so they are not included onto the global jihad map.
Influencing perceptions is what wins or loses war these days. The international information environment is critical to the success of America’s mission. Montgomery McFate is an anthropologist and is helping the defense department understand the importance of a cultural knowledge.
She wrote in the Joint force Quarterly, “once the Sunni Bathists lost their prestigious jobs, were humiliated in the conflict, and got frozen out through Bathification, the tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency. The tribal insurgency is a direct result of our misunderstanding of Iraqi culture.” Also the U.S. lost their information battle because they focused on broadcast media, but this was not so useful as most Iraqi’s got their news from rumors in coffee shops.
A counter insurgency strategy according to Kilcullen consists of a resistance to the message, co-opt or assist people that have a counter message, and consider supporting or creating rival organizations. The key according to him is providing a social context for individuals to chose ways other than jihad.
The frightening development in this article is the inclusion of academics like anthropologists into serving the interests of the military. Cultural knowledge is crucial to understand the dynamics of how people and societies function. But to use that knowledge against the same people, that have trusted the anthropologist and given them information about themselves is unethical.
David Kilcullen, an Australian who has a doctorate in political anthropology from the University of New South Wales, wrote on the Darul Islam conflict, a Muslim insurgency movement in Indonesia during the 1950's and 1960's. During his study he saw similar behavior and similar problems in an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a Christian separatist insurgency in East Timor. He felt the problem was not Islam but human social networks and the way that they operate. People get pulled into insurgency through friends, family and associates.
Kilcullen noted after watching Bin Laden tapes, that Bin Laden was creating an implicit association between himself and the Democratic party, for he believed that Bush’s strategy on the war on terror was sustaining his own global importance. “Al Qaeda’s core leadership had became a propaganda hub. If Bin laden didnt have access to global media, satellite communications, and the internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave.”
Countering counterinsurgency requires rethinking the current thinking about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kilcullen redefined the war on terror as a “global counterinsurgency”. Knowing the turf, which includes the people, topography, economy, history and culture of the area is essential.Also there is a need to “disaggregate insurgencies: finding ways to address local grievances in Pakistan’s tribal areas or along the Thai and Malay border, so they are not included onto the global jihad map.
Influencing perceptions is what wins or loses war these days. The international information environment is critical to the success of America’s mission. Montgomery McFate is an anthropologist and is helping the defense department understand the importance of a cultural knowledge.
She wrote in the Joint force Quarterly, “once the Sunni Bathists lost their prestigious jobs, were humiliated in the conflict, and got frozen out through Bathification, the tribal network became the backbone of the insurgency. The tribal insurgency is a direct result of our misunderstanding of Iraqi culture.” Also the U.S. lost their information battle because they focused on broadcast media, but this was not so useful as most Iraqi’s got their news from rumors in coffee shops.
A counter insurgency strategy according to Kilcullen consists of a resistance to the message, co-opt or assist people that have a counter message, and consider supporting or creating rival organizations. The key according to him is providing a social context for individuals to chose ways other than jihad.
The frightening development in this article is the inclusion of academics like anthropologists into serving the interests of the military. Cultural knowledge is crucial to understand the dynamics of how people and societies function. But to use that knowledge against the same people, that have trusted the anthropologist and given them information about themselves is unethical.
Comments
I'm studying COIN as I'm military and going to Iraq soon...
dakotaaviator*gmail.com